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Abstract
We investigate the combined effect of an Emissions Trading System (ETS) and re-
newable energy sources on electricity generation investments in energy-only markets. We
study the long-term capacity expansion decision in fossil fuel and renewable technologies
when electricity demand is uncertain. We model a relevant tradeoff: a higher share of
renewable production can be priced at the higher marginal cost of fossil fuel production,
yet the likelihood of achieving higher profits is reduced because more electricity demand
is met by cheaper renewable production. We illustrate our theoretical results comparing
the optimal solutions under business-as-usual and various ETSs and renewables scenarios.
This illustration shows under which limiting market settings a monopolist prefers withhold-
ing investments in renewable energy sources, highlighting the potential distortionary effect
introduced via the ETS. Our conclusions remain unaltered under varying key modelling
assumptions.
JEL: D43, L51, L94, Q48.
Keywords: Emissions Trading System; Energy-Mix; Pass-Through; Electricity Markets;
Electricity Sector.
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1 Introduction
The past five years have witnessed a systematic decrease in the electricity sector oper-
ational profitability and a consequent decline in capacity investments in market-based
systems (Financial Times, 2015; The Economist , 2015). Overcapacity of fossil fuel elec-
tricity generation and a larger share of renewable electricity generation1 are among the
main causes (Koch et al., 2014). Particularly in Europe, renewables2 have not just put
pressure on margins; they have also transformed the established business model of utili-
ties (The Economist , 2013). Electricity from renewables has favorable access to the grid,
squeezing the earnings of polluting generation. However, this preferential grid access is not
solely the result of policies favouring renewables. It is also logical in electricity markets
that operate based on the merit order: since the marginal cost of renewables is virtually
zero, grids would take their electricity first anyway. In this paper, we explore some of the
implications of this changing business model on the long-term capacity expansion decision
of the electricity sector when polluting emissions from fossil fuel generation are regulated
by an Emissions Trading System (ETS).
The long-term capacity expansion decision in the electricity sector (the so-called energy-
mix decision) is key to the goal of a low-carbon economy. Electricity and heat generated
by fuel combustion are responsible for approximately 42% of CO2 emissions worldwide
(International Energy Agency, 2017). Consequently, electricity sectors in many countries
have been brought under ETS regulations. This is the case in Europe (EU ETS, European
Union Emissions Trading System), the US (Californian cap-and-trade program), South
Korea (KETS, Korea Emissions Trading Scheme), and China (pilot ETS in the Province
1We will write fossil fuel generation as a shorthand throughout the paper. Besides, conventional generation
and polluting generation will be used as synonyms. Also, we will write renewable generation as a shorthand
throughout the paper. And non-conventional generation and green generation will be used as synonyms.
2Renewables will be used as a shorthand for renewable energy sources throughout the paper.
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of Guangdong). In particular, the EU ETS is a cornerstone of the European policy to reduce
CO2 (80% by 2050, see European Commission, 2011) and, ultimately, to combat climate
change. Research studying the energy-mix decision in the presence of an ETS is slowly
emerging and has primarily focused on the short-term effects, e.g. the fuel switching effect
(see Kirat and Ahamada, 2011, and references therein). We contribute to this literature
by investigating the impact of emission caps on long-term capacity expansion decisions in
energy-only markets. The policy implications of our work directly speak to the debate
about the role of capacity markets and equivalent administrative interventions.
Central to this problem is the tradeoff on profits associated with increased renewable
generation. Investments in renewables drive fossil fuel plants out of the market, resulting in
costly idle capacity. This is the so-called merit order effect. Yet, investments in renewables
generate higher rents because green generation can be sold at the marginal cost of fossil fuel
plants. Which of the two effects dominates depends on which generation is at the margin.
This means that electricity producers might have an incentive to withhold investments
in renewable capacity. The market structure and the regulatory framework are crucial
for determining the extent to which the electricity sector withholds capacity investments.
In recent contributions, Murphy and Smeers (2005), Zo¨ttl (2011), Murphy and Smeers
(2012), and Grimm and Zoettl (2013) investigate capacity investment incentives when
markets are not competitive. These authors show that withholding capacity investments
can in fact increase profits, ultimately hampering adequate capacity installation. These
papers develop their analysis either abstracting from the presence of emission regulations,
or treating emission regulations in the form of an ETS as given. In particular, the price
of allowances associated with an ETS is either omitted or treated as a given parameter.3
However, in the energy-mix decision, which is long-term, the price of allowances depends
3We will write allowances as a shorthand for emission allowances associated with an ETS throughout the
paper.
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heavily on the energy-mix itself. Consequently, such a price should be treated (as we do
here) as an endogenous variable and should be part of the long-term capacity expansion
decision.
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by investigating how an ETS affects
the profits resulting from long-term capacity expansion decisions. This line of analysis
adds to the growing literature that stresses the need to account for the full effects of
coexisting emission constraints and renewable energy source policies due to the sometimes
conflicting incentives of the stakeholders involved.4 Acknowledging these effects is critically
important for the design of long-term electricity markets since conflicting incentives can
often lead to suboptimal outcomes, or even outcomes in contrast to the compelling goals of
the environmental policy. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2017) investigates the incentives
of fossil fuel energy producers to increase the share of renewables in their energy portfolios.
They demonstrate, in an oligopolistic setup, that the installation of renewable capacity can
actually decrease net welfare as a result of reductions in energy production when the supply
of renewables is high. We also assume a cooperative oligopoly in capacity investments and
adopt an equivalent monopolist set up to examine the interplay between incentives to the
electricity sector and prices of electricity and allowances.
The monopolist set up allows us to transparently investigate the potential distortion
of market prices in energy-only markets via an ETS.5 We do not undertake a full-fledged
welfare analysis. Rather, we focus our attention on key socio-economic variables, such as
the percentages of renewable generation and fossil fuel generation, the level of electricity
prices, and the level of profits accruing to the electricity sector, and compare the solutions
4Previous analyses have highlighted the potential detrimental impacts of overlapping renewable energy
source policies (reviewed by Fischer and Preonas, 2010), including overall declines in cost-efficiency
(Bo¨hringer et al., 2008, 2009) and increases in the consumer electricity price (Bo¨hringer and Behrens,
2015). We add to this literature too.
5In energy-only markets, electricity producers are paid for the amount of electricity produced, but they are
not compensated for keeping capacity available.
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under a Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenario and under an ETS scenario.
Our theoretical results show that the monopolist has an incentive to drive the allowances
price to the level of the penalty for non-compliance.6 This occurs when allowances to cover
emissions associated to fossil fuel generation are insufficient. Thus, the decarbonizing
potential of the ETS is weakened. We illustrate this result with a quantitative example and
present under which limiting market setting renewable capacity is increased. These results
provide insights into the observed decline of new investments in renewables in Europe,7
where the flagship ETS is entering its fourth (more stringent) Phase and the existing share
of renewable capacity is already significant. As such, our analysis also contributes to the
current discussion on the reform of energy and environmental policies.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. In Section 2, we develop an analyt-
ical model of the long-term capacity expansion decision of a monopolist that can supply
electricity both from fossil fuel and renewables plants. In Section 3, we solve the long-
term capacity expansion problem of the monopolist and describe how the installation of
renewable capacity impacts on profits. In Section 4, we illustrate the combined effects of
increased renewables penetration and more stringent emission regulations by numerically
solving the long-term capacity expansion problem under two scenarios and for three distinct
market settings. Section 5 discusses the implications of relaxing the key model assump-
tions of monopoly and perfectly inelastic electricity demand, as well as relaxing various
6The results in Hintermann (2017) are compatible with our theory. In Hintermann (2017), the monopolist
under-abates emissions in order to drive up the allowances price. The logic in our model and in that
of Hintermann is the same: driving up the allowances price increases the costs of marginal plants, but
it also increases infra-marginal profits. Previous arguments along similar lines are discussed in Misiolek
and Elder (1989) and, more recently, in Hintermann (2011). The assertion that regulated electricity firms
benefit from a higher allowances price has been empirically verified (e.g. see Oberndorfer, 2009; Hirth and
Ueckerdt, 2013).
7New investments in renewables in Europe peaked in 2011 at $120 billion and have fallen ever since; new
capacity investments in 2015 and 2016 were less than half that maximum at $59.8 billion (see Frankfurt
School-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance and Bloomberg New Energy
Finance, 2017).
4
modelling choices (adjustments of capacity expansion; inter-temporal allowance banking;
and regulatory adjustments). Section 6 concludes. The Appendix reports several details
of the solution to the long-term capacity expansion problem, with a particular focus on a
sensitivity analysis with respect to two key model parameters.
2 Model
2.1 Market structure
We consider an electricity sector endowed with polluting and green technologies. We also
assume that plants are owned by few large electricity producers, so that the electricity
sector can be seen as an oligopoly. Around the world, electricity markets remain highly
concentrated, with few major national producers controlling a substantial share of the
domestic capacity. For example, according to EIA,8 the first 108 US electricity producers
(over a total of 4, 138) accounted for 60% of the national nominal capacity in 2017. In
addition, in the 9 largest European national markets9, approximately 3, 208 electricity
producers covered 95% of net domestic demand in 2016, but only 30 of them had a domestic
market share larger than 5%.10 Yet, cross-border electricity transmissions are increasing,
contributing to the development of a more competitive electricity market.
In order to simplify our analytic treatment and concentrate on the price distortion
of an ETS, we assume that electricity production is sold through the standard system
of uniform auction. This price fixing mechanism and the presence of a share of smaller
competitive electricity producers can exert a significant pressure on major producers to
make them bid at the marginal cost (as if they were acting under perfect competition).
8see https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/.
9Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (with data for 2012), Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK.
10see Eurostat at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Electri
city market indicators#Electricity markets - generation and installed capacity.
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Notice that assuming collusion on the electricity market by producers that, consequently,
would charge a constant markup on top of their marginal costs would leave our main
conclusions unaffected. Indeed, such a markup would not eliminate the economic incentive
to profit from exceeding the emissions cap. This will be discussed in more detail later.
Moreover, we assume that electricity producers act cooperatively to decide the energy-mix.
By adopting a cooperative oligopoly (or, equivalently, a monopolist set up), we obtain a
tractable model of the aggregated energy-mix decision. This allows us to obtain an analytic
solution of the problem and to transparently describe the distortion mechanism that an
ETS can spawn. Besides, the adoption of a cooperative oligopoly is not an outlandish
assumption given the anecdotal evidence of market concentration.11
In the following, we will use interchangeably the terms monopolist and electricity sector.
2.2 Model settings
The focus of the present paper is on the long-term impact of an ETS on the installation of
green technology capacity. As such, we abstract from short-term effects of an ETS, e.g. fuel
switching, and consider a single period model. The implications of a two-period extension
of our model are qualitatively discussed in Section 5.
Given period [0, T ], we distinguish the time of decision t = 0, the time when key infor-
mation is revealed (and uncertainty is resolved) t = 0+, and the generation period [0+, T ],
where no news are announced and no decisions take place. The capacity available at time
t = 0 is Qc and Qnc, for conventional and non-conventional technologies respectively (ca-
pacity will be expressed as the total MWh that can be potentially generated during period
[0+, T ]). At time t = 0, the electricity sector decides on the long-term expansion of its
capacity, and, in particular, the desired level of installation for conventional, ∆Qc, and
11In Europe, RWE takeover of EON electricity generation assets increased concentration on generation.
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non-conventional, ∆Qnc, capacity. Negative levels of installation mean that the respective
technology is disconnected/dismantled and will no longer generate electricity. For sim-
plicity, we assume that disconnecting a plant from the grid or dismantling a plant can be
done at insignificant cost. We neglect implementation time, so the new capacities for both
technologies are assumed to be immediately available and operational, and assume that
no additional capacity is added during period [0+, T ]. The long-term capacity expansion
decision is risky since electricity demand during period [0+, T ] (hereafter D) is uncertain
at time t = 0. D is assumed to be revealed at time t = 0+. In particular, D is normally
distributed with expected value µ and standard deviation  .12 In order to simplify the
analytical treatment, we also assume that D is price inelastic during period [0+, T ]. Our
results remain largely unaltered when considering an elastic electricity demand. We present
this case later in Section 5 and discuss its implications.
Two spot markets are relevant in this model: the electricity market and the allowances
market. In the first market, electricity is asked and offered, and p is the resulting equi-
librium price of 1 MWh of electricity. This price is set at time t = 0 and depends on
the uncertain level of D at that time. p remains constant during period [0+, T ]. In line
with the literature and the common practice in electricity markets, electricity is traded
through a uniform auction system. Under this setting, as it is well known, every agent
has an incentive to offer all its capacity at the marginal cost, “as if” agents were perfect
competitors (i.e. independently of the real level of competition in the market). In the
second market, which is a feature of an ETS, allowances can be traded. One allowance
entitles a producer to emit 1 tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2), the main greenhouse gas, or
12The uncertainty of the model is handled with the triple (Ω,A,P), where Ω is the event space, A is the
σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, whereas P is the probability corresponding to the normal distribution of D.
Besides, D has density function on the set of real numbers given by f(x) = 1
σ
√
2pi
e−
1
2
(µ−x
σ
)
2
. Even
though a non-negative distribution (e.g. lognormal) would be more appropriate for D, normality is still a
reasonable assumption as long as µ is significantly larger than σ, as, indeed, it is the case in this analysis.
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the equivalent amount of two other powerful greenhouse gases, nitrous oxide (N2O) and
perfluorocarbons (PFCs). In the following, we will not distinguish among these greenhouse
gases, and we will label them as CO2e. The price of an allowance is pa and it is paid
upfront at time t = 0 when allowances are auctioned off (and D is uncertain).
The electricity sector faces two distinct generation costs: direct production costs and the
cost of allowances (environmental cost). Let cv,nc and cv,c represent the costs of generating
1 MWh of electricity using non-conventional and conventional plants, respectively. The
regulatory authority determines the number of allowances, C. Thus, if a conventional plant
emits m tonnes of CO2e to generate of 1 MWh of electricity, the (unit) cost of allowances is
ca = mpa per each MWh. Furthermore, H = C/m MWh corresponds to the total conven-
tional generation covered by allowances. In other words, conventional plants can produce
a maximum of H MWh of electricity - covered by C allowances - to remain compliant with
the emissions cap. In case of non-compliance, producers must pay the penalty f for each
tonne of CO2e beyond C. We define an ETS as being effective if the total emissions of
CO2e from fossil fuel generation do not exceed C. At time t = 0, the demand of allowances
by the electricity sector is m×min(H;Qc +∆Qc). By arbitrage arguments (e.g. see Car-
mona et al., 2010; Chesney and Taschini, 2012), ca, which is the cost of allowances at time
t = 0, is determined by the probability that during period [0+, T ] conventional plants will
be required to produce more electricity than can be covered by allowances.
Finally, since the aim of the paper is to study the long-term impact of an ETS on
the energy-mix decision, we consider the case where period [0, T ] covers the entire lifetime
of new capacity investments. Also, we assume that (i) the ETS ends at T and (ii) the
amount of allowances needed by non-electricity sectors just equals the amount of allowances
allocated to them. Thus, we abstract from (i) banking and borrowing of allowances and
(ii) trading between the electricity and non-electricity sectors. We consider the effect of
8
banking in Section 5.
2.3 Energy-only markets and the merit order curve
In an energy-only market, prices are determined by the interaction between demand and
supply, and supply is determined by the merit order. The merit order is a ranking of
electricity generation, based on ascending marginal costs. In practice, non-conventional
plants (such as wind, solar, and nuclear plants) have extremely low marginal costs, so
electricity from these plants is usually cheaper than that generated by conventional plants
using coal or natural gas as fuel. This means that, when demand is low and fully satisfied by
non-conventional technologies, electricity is priced at the marginal cost of non-conventional
plants. Electricity producers will turn on conventional plants only if the supply of non-
conventional plants does not fully satisfy demand. In this case, electricity is priced at the
marginal cost of conventional production.
gross
profits
electricity
price
(€/ )
p
MWh
p c= v c,
D
capacity, demand
( )
D
MWh
non-conventional
(or green) plants
conventional
(or fossil fuel) plants
cv nc,
Figure 1: The classic merit order curve ranks electricity generation based on ascending
marginal costs. The curve is a step-function with two values: the near-zero cost of non-
conventional generation and the higher cost of conventional generation. Electricity from
non-conventional plants is used first to meet demand, followed by electricity from conven-
tional plants.
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Hence, the merit order is a step-function composed of different marginal costs, each
cost depending on one among many types of energy sources. Our analysis uses a simplified
two-step merit order curve consisting of only two types of energy sources, non-conventional
and conventional (see Figure 1). Since this approach groups all polluting technologies in a
single class, it is not cater for the modelling of short-term fuel switching effects of allowances
markets. Nevertheless, given our interest on the long-term impact of an ETS to drive the
decarbonization process of an economy, the aggregate capacity of green technologies versus
that of conventional technologies are the fundamental variables to be modelled here.
Figure 1 clearly shows the peak-load pricing effect: when electricity demand is high,
non-conventional production is priced at the higher marginal cost of conventional plants.
Profit opportunities change introducing an ETS. Morthorst (2001), Bo¨hringer and
Rosendhal (2011), and, more recently, Bo¨hringer and Behrens (2015) investigate how
emission constraints change the electricity market outcome of support schemes for non-
conventional production. We complement this stream of works by deriving analytical
dependencies between the long-term capacity expansion decision and prices of electricity
and allowances. In the presence of an ETS, producers need to buy m allowances for every
MWh of conventional generation (recall that m is the number of tonnes of CO2e emitted
from the generation of 1 MWh of electricity). Therefore, the cost of allowances must be
included into the direct costs. The impact of the cost of allowances on electricity prices
is modelled here by a pass-through coefficient   ∈ [0, 1], which describes the ability of the
electricity sector to transfer a fraction of the cost of allowances to consumers.
If D is large enough to require the contribution of conventional plants, the price of
electricity will be equal to
p = cv,c +  mpa,
where pa is the market price of the allowance to emit 1 tonne of CO2e. At time t = 0, pa is
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calculated as a risk-neutral expectation of its final price. We provide the expression of such
a price in Eq. (2). The value of pa during period [0
+, T ] is, however, much simpler than that
of pa at time t = 0. Since D is assumed to be perfectly known at time t = 0
+, by simple
arbitrage arguments, it is immediate to see that the market price of allowances becomes
either 0 or f > 0 and remains constant during period [0+, T ]. Indeed, as soon asD is known,
it is immediate to check if the generation required from polluting plants exceeds H (i.e. the
generation threshold that can be covered by existing allowances). In case of an excess of
emissions, producers must pay the penalty mf for every MWh of uncovered conventional
generation (i.e. generation beyond H, see Figure 2), whereas allowances become worthless
in the opposite case. The pass-through coefficient   has been the subject of some recent
studies. Using different econometric techniques, Sijm et al. (2006), Bunn and Fezzi (2007),
Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008), Fabra and Reguant (2014), Wild et al. (2015), and
Hintermann (2016) find empirical evidence of pass-through of allowance costs in numerous
electricity markets. This literature shows that there is potential for high levels of pass-
through of allowance costs.13 However, it does not provide unambiguous figures. In the
Appendix, we present a sensitivity analysis, where we investigate the influence of different
levels of pass-through of allowance costs on the long-term capacity expansion decision.
If, at time t = 0, D is expected to be particularly high, so that conventional generation
will exceed H, we can assume that pa, i.e. the risk-neutral expectation in Eq. (2), is equal
to f . Depending on the pass-through coefficient  , the electricity market is cleared at the
marginal cost of uncovered conventional plants:
p = cv,c +  mf .
As Figure 2 shows, this price generates large profit opportunities for both technologies.
13All these studies do not reject the null hypothesis of complete pass-through.
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MWh
p c= v c,
capacity, demand
( )
D
MWh
non-conventional
(or green) plants
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D
H
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cv nc,
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Figure 2: The possible impact of including the cost of allowances into electricity prices (the
so-called pass-through of allowance costs) with t > 0. Large gross profits can be expected
if the level of demand requires polluting plants to exceed the covered generation H, which
fixes electricity prices at p = cv,c +  mf .
Comparing the size of profits in the two figures, it is evident that the monopolist has an
incentive to drive up the allowances price and, consequently, to increase its infra-marginal
profits.
2.4 Relevant events
In this framework, uncertainty is represented by the unknown value of D at time t = 0.
The event space Ω can be split into three events:
A1 = {! ∈ Ω : D ≤ Qnc +∆Qnc},
A2 = {! ∈ Ω : Qnc +∆Qnc < D < Qnc +∆Qnc +H},
A3 = {! ∈ Ω : D > Qnc +∆Qnc +H}.
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Recall that H corresponds to the maximum conventional generation that can be covered
by allowances.
Let us consider the possible values of electricity and allowance prices during period
[0+, T ], i.e. when electricity demand is known. In event A1, electricity demand is entirely
satisfied by non-conventional capacity, D ≤ Qnc+∆Qnc, so the allowances demand falls to
zero and pa must be zero. In this case, the electricity price p is only driven by the marginal
cost of green technologies. Therefore,14
p(A1) = cv,nc and pa(A1) = 0.
In event A2, electricity demand exceeds non-conventional capacity. However, in this case,
all emissions are covered by allowances: Qnc+∆Qnc < D < Qnc+∆Qnc+H. Therefore, the
conditional price of allowances is zero and the electricity price coincides with the marginal
cost of polluting technologies:15
p(A2) = cv,c and pa(A2) = 0.
In event A3, the electricity demand is so high that D exceeds both non-conventional and
covered conventional capacities: D > Qnc+∆Qnc+H. Technically, total emissions of CO2e
from fossil fuel generation exceed C, and the ETS is environmentally ineffective. Hence,
producers must pay the penalty for each uncovered tonne of CO2e and the conditional
price of allowances reaches f . Therefore,16
p(A3) = cv,c +  mf and pa(A3) = f .
14With a small abuse of notation, we write p(A1) to mean p(ω) for all ω ∈ A1. The same simplification
applies to pa(A1).
15See footnote 14, with A2 in place of A1.
16See footnote 14, with A3 instead of A1.
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Table 1 synthesizes the values of some variables depending on a combination of technical
conditions and chance. The technical conditions depend on H and the energy-mix decision.
The chance, events A1, A2, and A3, consists of realized levels of electricity demand.
Table 1: Electricity and allowance prices for t ∈ [0+, T ], as identified by a combination
of technical conditions and realized levels of electricity demand. The technical conditions
depend on H and the energy-mix decision, i.e. Qnc +∆Qnc and Qc +∆Qc.
Technical Allowances Cost Electricity
condition Event price, pa of allowances, ca price, p
Qnc +∆Qnc > 0 A1 0 0 cv,nc
Qc +∆Qc > 0 A2 0 0 cv,c
Qc +∆Qc > H A3 f mf cv,c +  mf
We assume throughout the paper that the technical conditions are satisfied. In par-
ticular, they will be included into the constraints of the optimization problem developed
here.
2.5 Electricity and allowance prices
At time t = 0, the electricity price p is calculated as an expectation. We denote it as p0:
p0 = p (A1)P(A1) + p (A2)P(A2) + p (A3)P(A3),
where p(Ai), i = 1, 2, 3, is the price of electricity during period [0
+, T ] for the three events
A1, A2, and A3. Recalling that D is normally distributed with expected value µ and
standard deviation  , the expression of the electricity price at time t = 0 can be analytically
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written as
p0 = cv,nc|{z}
p(A1)
✓
1
 
√
2⇡
Z Qnc+∆Qnc
−∞
e−
1
2
(x−µ
σ
)
2
dx
◆
| {z }
P(A1)
(1)
+ cv,c|{z}
p(A2)
✓
1
 
√
2⇡
Z Qnc+∆Qnc+H
Qnc+∆Qnc
e−
1
2
(x−µ
σ
)
2
dx
◆
| {z }
P(A2)
+ (cv,c +  mf)| {z }
p(A3)
✓
1− 1
 
√
2⇡
Z Qnc+∆Qnc+H
−∞
e−
1
2
(x−µ
σ
)
2
dx
◆
| {z }
P(A3)
.
Recall that allowances have a positive price only in event A3 (non-compliance event). By
arbitrage arguments (e.g. see Carmona et al., 2008) and assuming a risk-neutral electricity
sector, a null interest rate, and a normally distributed electricity demand, it is possible to
show that the price of allowances at time t = 0, which we denote as pa,0, is equal to the
product between the penalty for non-compliance f and the probability of event A3:
pa,0 = f
 
E(1(H,∞) (D −Qnc −∆Qnc))
 
= f
✓
1− 1
 
√
2⇡
Z Qnc+∆Qnc+H
−∞
e−
1
2
(x−µ
σ
)
2
dx
◆
,
(2)
where 1(H,∞) (D −Qnc −∆Qnc) is the indicator function that is equal to one if electricity
demand is satisfied by uncovered conventional generation.
2.6 Gross and net profits of the electricity sector
In this section, we analyse the profits accruing to the electricity sector. To develop an
economic intuition for the results of the model, we analyse the gross profits accruing to
the electricity sector (i.e. total revenues less direct costs incurred to generate and sell
electricity). Gross profits can be more directly linked to the variables discussed so far,
and can be represented as areas of regions under the merit order curves presented in the
15
previous sections (see Figures 1 and 2). Later on, we turn to the analysis of net profits,
including fixed costs.
positive gross profits
cv,c
!mf
zero gross profits positive and negative
components of gross profits
A1 A2 A3
ca,0
H
D
3
Q Qnc nc+" Q Qc c+"
H
D
Q Qc c+"Q Qnc nc+"
H
D
ca,0 2
1
Q Qc c+"Q Qnc nc+"
cv,c cv,c
!mf !mf
6(1-!)mf
4 5
Figure 3: Gross profits, in e per MWh, depending on events Ai, i = 1, 2, 3, of the sample
space Ω (capacity, “Q” and “∆Q”, and electricity demand, D, are given in MWh). In
particular, ca,0 = mpa,0 and pa,0 is defined in Eq. (2).
The areas of the shaded regions in Figure 3 illustrate the (conditional) gross profits
associated with the three events A1, A2, and A3 discussed in Section 2.4. In this figure,
variable costs of green technologies are set equal to zero (cv,nc = 0). This figure highlights
some aspects relevant to our discussion. First, apart from event A1, where gross profits
are zero, the size of gross profits directly depends on the decision variables ∆Qnc and
∆Qc. Second, gross profits do not proportionally increase with electricity demand. Rather,
they increase by steps, as soon as D exceeds the thresholds defining the three events.
Nevertheless, in case of events A2 and A3, we observe a negative component (areas of regions
2 and 6, respectively), proportionally changing with electricity demand. More precisely,
the area of region 2 accounts for the initial cost of allowances used to cover the generation
required by D. As such, these are direct generation costs. Unused allowances, on the
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contrary, can be treated as sunk costs. Because the summation of the two cost components
is constant, the initial cost of allowances does not generally depend on electricity demand,
as it will be made clear in the expression of expected profits accrued to the electricity sector
(see Eq. (8)). Third, in case of event A3, a significant share of gross positive profits from
non-conventional and conventional generation is represented by the areas of regions 4 and
5. This sizeable amount makes event A3 highly desirable. Concurrently, when event A3 is
realized, there is a negligible negative component too, area of region 6. This corresponds
to the penalty paid for the excess generation (beyond H). Both the area of region 5 is
sizeably positive and that of region 6 is negligibly negative for empirically relevant values
of  . As it will be clear in Section 3, the crux of the energy-mix decision is to increase the
likelihood of event A3.
We now turn to net profits, which are obtained by subtracting fixed costs from gross
profits. Fixed costs contain different components, mainly labour, maintenance, and invest-
ment, and they can be linked to the size of plants. We define fixed costs as
FC = FC(cf,c, cf,nc) = cf,c (Qc +∆Qc) + cf,nc (Qnc +∆Qnc) + ↵ (Qnc +∆Qnc)
2 ,
where cf,nc and cf,c are the unit investment costs (per MWh) of non-conventional and
conventional plants, respectively. Notice that we consider a linear function of costs for
conventional plants and a quadratic function of non-conventional costs. We motivate this
choice with the fact that, for non-conventional plants, the best locations are used first, with
the consequence that the capacity investments required to obtain 1 MWh should increase
more than linearly as the total capacity in place gets larger.17
Given these costs and assuming the technical conditions of Table 1, we examine the net
17The constant returns assumption for conventional plants follows from the fact that conventional tech-
nologies are easily scalable and, consequently, do not generate a scarcity rent. The decreasing returns
assumption for non-conventional plants follows from the fact that the best production sites are used first
and that further non-conventional development implies investing in less and less productive sites.
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profits in the electricity sector under the three events A1, A2, and A3. In event A1, elec-
tricity demand is entirely satisfied by non-conventional capacity, D ≤ Qnc +∆Qnc. Gross
profits are zero because the price of electricity is equal to the variable cost of generation,
which is zero by assumption (left panel of Figure 3). In this case, the conditional net profits
G are negative because of fixed costs and the cost of allowances:18
G(A1) = −FC − ca,0H. (3)
In event A2, electricity demand requires the contribution of conventional capacity (in
addition to non-conventional capacity), Qnc + ∆Qnc < D < Qnc + ∆Qnc + H, but all
emissions from conventional generation are covered by allowances. In this case, non-
conventional generation is sold at a price equal to the cost of conventional generation.
The conditional net profits G are equal to19
G(A2) = −FC − ca,0H + (cv,c − cv,nc) (Qnc +∆Qnc) . (4)
In event A3, D > Qnc +∆Qnc +H. Conventional plants generate electricity in excess
of the threshold H. Therefore, the marginal cost of electricity must include both the cost
of conventional generation (cv,c) and the penalty per unit (MWh) of emission eventually
reduced by the pass-through coefficient ( mf). The conditional net profits G are equal
18With a small abuse of notation, we write G(A1) to mean G(ω) for all ω ∈ A1.
19See footnote 18, with A2 in place of A1.
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to20
G(A3) = −FC + ( mf − ca,0)H (5)
+ (  − 1)mf (D −Qnc −∆Qnc −H)
+ ( mf + cv,c − cv,nc) (Qnc +∆Qnc) .
Depending on the levels of the pass-through coefficient, it is not always preferable to
expand non-conventional capacity. We discuss this later in footnote 21.
Two observations are in order. First, the application of a constant markup on top of
marginal costs leaves our conclusions unaltered. Such a markup can only change the height
of the shaded regions in Figure 3, leaving the energy-mix decision problem – namely, the
control of the horizontal dimension of the shaded regions – practically unaffected. Second,
we do not consider the case of D = Qnc+∆Qnc+H, i.e. the case where D exactly exhausts
allowances. This is an unlikely event – the probability of this event is zero if D is assumed
to be an absolutely continuous random variable. Also, the price of allowances would not
be uniquely defined in such a case: indeed, it could take any value between 0 and f .
2.7 Operational and allowance components of profits
For each of the three events, we can separate gross profits into two components: an opera-
tional component and an allowance component . The operational component is determined
by the sale of non-conventional electricity at the marginal cost of conventional generation.
The allowance component comes from including into the price of electricity the cost of
allowances needed to cover emissions from conventional generation.
Assuming the technical conditions of Table 1 and conditioning on the corresponding
event, we have the following results. In event A1, there is neither operational component
20See footnote 18, with A3 instead of A1.
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nor allowance component. In event A2, the operational component is positive and the
allowance component is negative:
G(A2) + FC + ca,0(H −D +Qnc +∆Qnc)| {z }
sunk cost for unused allowances
(6)
= (cv,c − cv,nc) (Qnc +∆Qnc)| {z }
operational component
− ca,0(D −Qnc −∆Qnc)| {z }
allowance component
.
The allowance component is negative because the conventional generation “consumes”
allowances that costed ca,0 per MWh. It corresponds to the area of region 2 in the central
panel of Figure 3. Unused allowances, on the contrary, are treated as sunk costs. In event
A3, the operational component is positive and the allowance component, depending on the
levels of the pass-through coefficient  , can be positive or negative:
G(A3) + FC = ( mf − ca,0)H + ( mf + cv,c − cv,nc) (Qnc +∆Qnc) (7)
− (1−  )mf (D −Qnc −∆Qnc −H)
= (cv,c − cv,nc) (Qnc +∆Qnc)| {z }
operational component
− (1−  )mf (D −Qnc −∆Qnc −H)| {z }
allowance component
+  mf (Qnc +∆Qnc +H)− ca,0H| {z }
allowance component
.
Notice that only small values of   generate a negative allowance component.21 In the
21We can identify the threshold value of β associated with a null allowance component for G(A3) in Eq. (7).
Such a null component is equivalent to the areas of regions 4, 5, and 6 in Figure 3 summing up to 0.
Let us call this value β¯. Adopting values of β lower than β¯ causes the area of region 6 to prevail with
respect to the areas of regions 4 and 5, therefore making the allowance component negative. Since the
allowance component depends on the random variable D, we perform the calculation of β¯ on the expected
allowance component of event A3, i.e. the expression of the allowance component in Eq. (7) multiplied
by the probability of event A3. After some rearrangement, β¯ is such that 
−
 
1− β¯
 
mf (D −Qnc −∆Qnc −H) + β¯mf (Qnc +∆Qnc +H)− ca,0H
 
× P(A3) = 0.
Given the market settings of Section 4.1 and the capacity investment decisions under the ETS scenario
of Section 4.2 (see, in particular, Table 4), the values of β¯ are 0.04, 0.40, 0.42, and 0.28, for the low RES
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Appendix, we present a sensitivity analysis, where we examine the influence of the level of
  on the long-term capacity expansion decision.
3 Long-term capacity expansion problem
The long-term capacity expansion problem is solved at time t = 0, i.e. when D is unknown.
We consider the case where the monopolist maximizes expected profits under the capacity
expansion constraints previously discussed. Combining Eq. (3), (4), and (5) along with the
corresponding probabilities (see Eq. (1)), expected profits are
E(G) = G(A1)P(A1) +G(A2)P(A2) +G(A3)P(A3), (8)
and, considering H (i.e. the conventional generation covered by allowances) and S (a min-
imum level of conventional capacity to guarantee the security of supply), the long-term
capacity expansion problem of the monopolist can be stated as22
max∆Qnc,∆Qc E(G)
s.t. ∆Qnc > −Qnc
∆Qc > H −Qc
∆Qc ≥ S −Qc
. (9)
The first constraint guarantees that the installed renewable capacity is positive. The second
constraint avoids the case where the emissions cap is slack, i.e. the probability of event A3
is zero. Indeed, if the installed conventional capacity (Qc + ∆Qc) happened to be lower
than H, event A3 would never occur. However, as discussed above, it is in the interest
of the monopolist that event A3 occurs. The third constraint guarantees that Qc + ∆Qc
(first two values), average RES, and high RES market settings, respectively.
22The long-term capacity expansion problem can be easily extended in various ways (e.g. presence of budget
constraints, risk constraints, etc.). We leave this for future research.
21
is not lower than the security of supply conventional capacity S. When (i) it is optimal
for the monopolist to reduce conventional capacity (which is, indeed, what we show in the
Appendix) and (ii) H progressively decreases (as it is expected in a low-carbon economy),
then S > H and the third constraint is more stringent than the second one.
We report the analytical solution to this problem in the Appendix. For evaluation
purposes, it must be partially numerically calculated. In the next section, we analyse the
problem through a quantitative application to three distinct market settings under two
scenarios.
Figure 4 shows the three levels of conditional profits (see Eq. (3), (4), and (5)), as
well as the corresponding probabilities (see Eq. (1)). The latter are the areas of the
three shaded portions of the distribution of D. Also, Figure 4 illustrates the tradeoff
faced by the monopolist when expanding non-conventional capacity from Qnc (left panel)
to Qnc + ∆Qnc > Qnc (right panel): a higher share of non-conventional production can
be priced at the higher marginal cost of conventional production; yet the likelihood of
achieving higher profits is reduced because more electricity demand is met by cheaper non-
conventional production. There is empirical evidence about such a tradeoff: Germany has
a high share of renewables in its current energy portfolio. In Germany, many electricity
producers complain that (relative to other countries) there is a higher chance that demand
is completely satisfied by non-conventional capacity (corresponding to A1), so electricity is
priced at the marginal cost of non-conventional plants (actually, the price of electricity has
occasionally become even negative).23 This indicates that German electricity producers
have an incentive to keep the expansion of renewables below some optimal threshold.
The decision to expand non-conventional capacity leads to several economic conse-
23Over the last few years, European wholesale electricity markets have shown a manifold increase of occur-
rences of negative prices (The Economist , 2017). For instance, in 2013, during a period of low demand
and high supply of wind and solar energy, the German wholesale electricity prices fell to −100 e/MWh
(The Economist , 2013).
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quences, of opposite signs:
• probability of event A1 (losses) expands, as there is a higher likelihood that non-
conventional generation can fully meet electricity demand. At the same time, the
increased fixed costs resulting from the additional non-conventional generation cause
higher losses within this region. Letting ∆Qnc > 0 clearly decreases the expectation
of these conditional profits;
• probability of event A2 (profits with only the operational component) shrinks espe-
cially if the share of non-conventional capacity is substantial; however, profits within
this region (G(A2)) can increase thanks to the additional non-conventional gener-
ation being sold at the price of conventional generation. Therefore, the impact of
∆Qnc > 0 is not clear;
• probability of event A3 (profits with a very high allowance component) shrinks with
certainty; however, profits within this region (G(A3)) increase sharply (especially for
values of   close to 1) due to: (a) additional non-conventional capacity being sold
at a higher unit profit and (b) covered conventional generation also being sold at a
profit. However, under particular circumstances (i.e.   very small and, at the same
time, D sufficiently high) conditional profits G(A3) can reduce significantly. Again,
the impact of ∆Qnc > 0 is not clear.
In summary, an increase of non-conventional capacity does not have an obvious overall
impact on expected profits. Much of this impact depends on the tradeoff between the
increase of G(A2) and G(A3) and the reduction of P(A2) and P(A3).
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Figure 4: Impact of a positive expansion of green technologies. Increasing the green ca-
pacity from Qnc (left panel) to Qnc +∆Qnc (right panel) impacts both the levels of profits
and the corresponding probabilities. In this example, the probability of the intermediate
level of profits (G(A2)) is reduced, that of the high level of profits (G(A3)) becomes very
small, while the probability of losses (G(A1)) increases greatly.
4 Numerical illustration
We present an application of the long-term capacity expansion Problem (9) that is nu-
merically solved first in the absence of emission regulations (BAU scenario) and then in
the presence of emission regulations (ETS scenario). The BAU scenario is the benchmark.
The benchmark solution is obtained by setting the penalty for non-compliance f equal to
zero. A null penalty dramatically simplifies the expression of expected profits (Eq. (8)):
the price of allowances is zero for t ∈ [0, T ] under all states of nature; consequently, the
allowance components in Eq. (6) and (7) vanish and the profits in events A2 and A3 be-
come indistinguishable. Notice also that, since the penalty is zero, the level of H becomes
irrelevant. The benchmark solution and the ETS solution are compared considering three
distinct market settings with various degrees of cap stringency and renewables penetration.
This allows us to test the impact of changes in the market setting on the long-term capacity
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expansion decision. Below we discuss first the market settings and then the solutions under
the BAU scenario and the ETS scenario.
4.1 Market settings
In all market settings, we set S, the minimum level of conventional capacity, equal to the
expected value of electricity demand, i.e. 200 MWh. This way, electricity demand can be
satisfied, on average, in all settings.
The first market setting (left panel of Figure 5) corresponds to the case where the
initial share of renewable capacity is the lowest (Qnc = 20 MWh) and the emissions cap
is relatively generous (H = 120 MWh). We label this market setting as low RES . The
second market setting, labelled as average RES (middle panel of Figure 5), corresponds
to the case where the initial share of renewable capacity is larger (Qnc = 100 MWh) and
the emissions cap is tighter (H = 100 MWh) than that of the first setting. Notice that
S > H in all three market settings and the security of supply constraint becomes binding.
The sum of initial non-conventional capacity and allowances exactly meet the expected
value of electricity demand, 200 MWh. Hence, at time t = 0, emissions from conventional
plants can exceed the cap with a probability of 50% (see the dashed segment with respect
to the distribution of D in the middle panel of Figure 5). The last market setting, labelled
as high RES , corresponds to the case where renewables cover a relatively large amount
of electricity demand (Qnc = 210 MWh) and the emissions cap is significantly tighter
(H = 20 MWh). In this last market setting, the initial non-conventional capacity plus
the amount of allowances cover electricity demand with a probability of 84% (right panel
of Figure 5). The model parameters common to the three distinct market settings are
reported in Table 2, whereas the initial capacities of these settings are reported in Table 3
and illustrated in Figure 5.
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Table 2: Model parameters common to the three distinct market settings.
Model parameter Value Model parameter Value
Security of supply conventional capacity, S (MWh) 200 cv,c (e/MWh) 60
Expected value of electricity demand, µ (MWh) 200 cv,nc (e/MWh) 0
Standard deviation of electricity demand,   (MWh) 30 cf,c (e/MWh) 1.5
m (tonnes/MWh) 1.1 cf,nc (e/MWh) 6
f (e/tonne) 100   1
↵ 0.01
Table 3: Initial capacities in the three distinct market settings.
Market setting
Capacity Low RES Average RES High RES
Initial conventional capacity, Qc (MWh) 330 330 330
Initial non-conventional capacity, Qnc (MWh) 20 100 210
Covered conventional capacity, H (MWh) 120 100 20
Initial non-conventional capacity, Qnc Initial conventional capacity, = 330Qc Amount of covered conventional capacity, H
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Figure 5: Capacities before installation decisions in the three distinct market settings of
the ETS scenario. Capacities are read on the horizontal axis only, whereas the vertical axis
shows the density of electricity demand.
26
4.2 Capacity investment decisions under the BAU and ETS scenarios
In order to assess the environmental outcome corresponding to each market setting, we
define the green ratio:
green ratio =
Qnc +∆Q
∗
nc
µ
.
The ratio quantifies the share of the expected value of electricity demand covered by renew-
able generation. Notice that a green ratio equal to 1 corresponds to just a 50% probability
that renewables will cover electricity demand since µ is the 50th percentile of the distribu-
tion of D.
Table 4 reports the solutions to Problem (9) and the corresponding green ratios under
the BAU and ETS scenarios and for all market settings. Table 5 focuses on the economic
variables, reporting the electricity price (Eq. (1)), the price of allowances (Eq. (2)),
expected profits (Eq. (8)), and the percentage of expected profits corresponding to the
allowance component of solutions. In particular, the latter corresponds to the sum of the
allowance component of Eq. (6) multiplied by the probability of event A2 and the allowance
component of Eq. (7) multiplied by the probability of event A3. Finally, this sum is divided
by the amount of expected profits.
We distinguish between optimal or suboptimal solutions and between normal or degen-
erate solutions. The first distinction is of mathematical nature: a suboptimal solution is
local, whereas an optimal solution is global. In some cases, the problem admits a subop-
timal solution that turns out to be of economic interest. The second distinction refers to
the outcome of an ETS missing its target, namely emissions below the cap. Unexpected
high levels of a normally distributed electricity demand (triggering event A3) have always
a positive probability. However, a solution aiming at exceeding the emissions cap also
when electricity demand takes average values will be labeled as degenerate. This is the
case where the electricity sector benefits the most from a high allowances price due to de-
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liberate non-compliance. Conversely, a normal solution seeks to maximize the probability
of event A2 (where profits result from selling non-conventional generation at the marginal
cost of conventional production), resulting in negligible probabilities of event A3. Similarly
to what happens under the BAU scenario, a normal solution neglects the influence of al-
lowances and turns out to be preferable from an environmental standpoint. It corresponds
to the highest green ratio. At the same time, it does not yield high electricity prices.
Table 4: Physical analysis of solutions: expansion of conventional and non-conventional
capacities, green ratios, under the BAU and ETS scenarios and for three distinct market
settings.
Market setting
BAU scenario Low RES Average RES High RES
Type of solution Optimal Optimal Optimal
Normal Normal Normal
∆Q∗c (MWh) −130 −130 −130
∆Q∗nc (MWh) 137.5 57.5 −52.5
Green ratio 0.7875 0.7875 0.7875
ETS scenario Low RES Low RES Average RES High RES
Type of solution Suboptimal Optimal Optimal Optimal
Normal Degenerate Degenerate Degenerate
∆Q∗c (MWh) −130 −130 −130 −130
∆Q∗nc (MWh) 133.5 57 −10.5 −63
Green ratio 0.7675 0.3850 0.4475 0.7350
Let us discuss the solutions under the BAU scenario first. Actually, we can talk about
a unique solution. A quick inspection of Table 4 reveals that the only apparent difference
across the three distinct market settings is about ∆Q∗nc. However, the final installed
renewable capacity (Qnc + ∆Q
∗
nc = 157.5 MWh) is constant in all market settings. As
for conventional capacity, we analytically show in the Appendix (under the BAU and ETS
scenarios) that it has a negative impact on expected profits. Indeed, the optimal solution
in all market settings (∆Q∗c = −130 MWh) consists in reducing it up to the security of
supply conventional capacity. Consequently, the green ratio remains constant too. The
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Table 5: Economic analysis of solutions: electricity prices, allowance prices, expected
profits, allowance components of profits, under the BAU and ETS scenarios and for three
distinct market settings.
Market setting
BAU scenario Low RES Average RES High RES
Type of solution Optimal Optimal Optimal
Normal Normal Normal
p0 (e/MWh) 55.30 55.30 55.30
pa,0 (e/tonne) 0 0 0
E(G) (e) 7217.10 7217.10 7217.10
Allowance component of E(G) (%) 0 0 0
ETS scenario Low RES Low RES Average RES High RES
Type of solution Suboptimal Optimal Optimal Optimal
Normal Degenerate Degenerate Degenerate
p0 (e/MWh) 57.15 119.38 130.04 152.76
pa,0 (e/tonne) 0.71 53.98 63.68 86.43
E(G) (e) 7316.13 8370.96 10721.88 21057.37
Allowance component of E(G) (%) 0.02 0.55 0.58 0.67
optimal solution under the BAU scenario is normal since, by construction, there is no
ETS. Turning to the economic perspective, the electricity price is equal to 55.30 e/MWh.
Absent an allowances market, this corresponds to the lowest price in all market settings.
Similarly, expected profits for the electricity sector take the lowest value (7271.10 e); they
do not include any allowance component.
In contrast to the BAU scenario, Table 4 shows that the solutions under the ETS
scenario are affected by the different market settings. The table reports the physical
features of four solutions, three optimal and one suboptimal. However, a common feature
of these solutions is that ∆Q∗c = −130 MWh, the same value as under the BAU scenario.
The (mathematically) suboptimal solution occurs in the low RES market setting and
it is similar to the optimal and normal solution under the BAU scenario. In this market
setting, the resulting non-conventional capacity and the green ratio are close to the BAU
scenario. This solution is normal since the probability of event A3 is approximately zero.
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Recall from Eq. (2) that allowance prices are linked to the probability of event A3 by
P(A3) = pa,0/f = pa,0/100 = 0.71%. Correspondingly, pa,0 = 0.71 e/tonne; p0 = 57.15
e/MWh is also low. Expected profits and the allowance component are slightly higher
than under the BAU scenario.
The three optimal solutions under the ETS scenario are all degenerate. The installed
renewable capacity, Qnc+∆Q
∗
nc, varies in response to the different levels of H in the three
distinct market settings. In particular, the smaller H the higher the installed renewable ca-
pacity, as one would expect under a progressively more stringent ETS. That said, we notice
that the installation of renewables, ∆Q∗nc, is systematically lower than that under the BAU
scenario. The difference between green capacities is particularly relevant in the low RES
and average RES market settings: 80.5 and 68 MWh, respectively. In particular, in the
average RES market setting, we observe a negative expansion (disconnection/dismantling)
equal to −10.5 MWh under the ETS scenario and a positive expansion of 57.5 MWh
under the BAU scenario. Similarly, the green ratio under ETS is systematically lower
than that under BAU. This is counterintuitive: sustained investments in renewables and
higher shares of green generation might be expected outcomes of an ETS. On the contrary,
the three optimal solutions are degenerate since emissions exceed the cap with substantial
probabilities (P(A3) = 54%, 64%, and 86.5%, respectively in the low RES, average RES,
and high RES market settings). Such probabilities are represented by the areas of the
shaded regions in Figure 6. The economic consequences of such solutions are dramatically
clear: allowance prices significantly increase, driving electricity prices to exceptionally high
levels; expected profits also increase (e.g. almost 300% with respect to the high RES market
setting under the BAU scenario), mainly due to the allowance component.
Figure 7 illustrates E(G) (under the ETS scenario and for all market settings) as a
function of the decision variables ∆Qnc and ∆Qc, under the constraints Qnc +∆Qnc > 0
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Figure 6: Installed renewable capacities, Qnc +∆Q
∗
nc, of the long-term capacity expansion
problem in the three distinct market settings of the ETS scenario. Capacities are read on
the horizontal axis only, whereas the vertical axis shows the density of electricity demand.
In the low RES market setting, both an optimal and degenerate solution and a suboptimal
and normal solution are obtained.
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and Qc + ∆Qc > 0. The graphical relationship between E(G) and ∆Qnc is self-evident.
Conversely, the dependence of E(G) and ∆Qc is not that neat. Yet, as shown in the
Appendix, the partial derivative @E(G)/@∆Qc is negative over all the domain.
Notice that the conventional capacity investment strategy of the monopolist is simple.
It has an incentive to reduce the installed conventional capacity Qc +∆Qc to H + ✏, with
✏ → 0+ (i.e. just enough to make event A3 possible). Yet, the supply constraint prevents
the monopolist from adopting such an extreme solution. This is clearly observable in the
figure, where the optimum occurs at ∆Qc = S−Qc. However, the corresponding expected
profits are lower than what would be attainable at ∆Qc = H −Qc. Finally, observe that,
for ∆Qc < H − Qc, expected profits drop because A3 becomes impossible. The incentive
to disconnect/dismantle conventional capacity illustrated here is related to the so-called
“missing money problem”. Among others, capacity compensation schemes (e.g. reliability
options, capacity markets) and the application of penalties to producers for electricity
demand left unsatisfied are alternative ways to address the security of supply.
The mathematical details of E(G), in particular its partial derivatives with respect
to both ∆Qnc and ∆Qc, are obtained and discussed in the Appendix, both under the
constraints of Problem (9) and considering only the constraints Qnc + ∆Qnc > 0 and
Qc+∆Qc > 0. In the Appendix, we also discuss the dependence of allowance and electricity
prices under the ETS scenario as functions of ∆Qnc.
To summarize, although one would expect that an ETS will sustain investments in
renewables in the long-term, our analysis shows that this is not the case when the electricity
sector acts cooperatively. Green capacity investments and green ratios are higher under
BAU than under ETS, highlighting the distortionary effect of an ETS. A tighter emissions
cap does not drive greater green capacity investments since the opportunity of exceeding
the cap remains unaffected. The effect of regulatory adjustments is discussed in Section 5.
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Figure 7: Expected profits, E(G), as a function of∆Qc (installation decision of conventional
capacity) and ∆Qnc (installation decision of non-conventional capacity), subject to the
constraints Qc + ∆Qc > 0 and Qnc + ∆Qnc > 0. The three panels refer to the market
settings adopted in the ETS scenario.
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5 Sensitivity to key assumptions
Our benchmark set up corresponds to a one-period model, where the long-term capacity
expansion decision is taken under uncertainty over the future electricity demand. Imme-
diately after the decision is taken, demand is realized and electricity is dispatched. By
focusing the analysis on a single period, the benchmark model abstracts from the pos-
sibility of capacity adjustments, banking of allowances, and regulatory adjustments. In
this section, we qualitatively discuss the sensitivity of our results to these key modelling
choices and to two model assumptions: perfectly inelastic electricity demand and the use
of a monopolistic framework.
Two- and multi-period frameworks A proper analysis of a multi-period decision
framework requires dynamic programming techniques and it is beyond the scope of this
work. Yet, it is possible to explore the likely impact of introducing an intermediate time
⌧ ∈ (0, T ), where adjustment of capacity can occur by building on the main lessons learned
from real options theory. For ease of exposition, let us suppose that the residual period
T − ⌧ is sufficiently long to cover the entire lifetime of new capacity investments. Also,
since the derivative of E(G) with respect to ∆Qc is negative and independent from D, we
concentrate the analysis on ∆Qnc.
As time passes, information accumulates. Thus, at time t = ⌧ , more information about
D is available. Under the real options approach, this introduces for the monopolist an
opportunity to optimally delay part of (or the entire) capacity expansion.
To see this, let us call ∆Q∗nc,0 the decision at time t = 0 and ∆Q
∗
nc,τ the decision at time
t = ⌧ and let us compare the result ∆Q∗nc,0 +∆Q
∗
nc,τ and the optimal expansion decided
in a one-period framework (∆Q∗nc). A qualitative description of this comparison can be
obtained examining panels b of Figures 11 and 12, where the blue curves correspond to the
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optimal solutions with a less uncertain D (i.e. smaller value of   = 10). According to the
real options theory, these solutions can be seen as if they were obtained under a two-period
framework. By the same token, the red curves correspond to the optimal solutions in the
one-period framework (  = 30, i.e. more uncertain D). We can observe that, when, in
the one-period framework, the optimal solution seeks event A3, then we have ∆Q
∗
nc,0 +
∆Q∗nc,τ < ∆Q
∗
nc, that is the disconnection/dismantling in the two-period framework will
be even more pronounced then that in the one-period framework. Vice versa, when, in
the one-period framework, the optimal solution is normal, then the conclusion is reversed:
∆Q∗nc,0 +∆Q
∗
nc,τ > ∆Q
∗
nc.
In summary, we can expect that our results could be extended to the two-period frame-
work. Also, this line of reasoning could extend the discussion from a two-period to a
multi-period framework.
Banking of allowances Most of existing ETS allow for some form of banking of unused
allowances between phases for future compliance. Borrowing future allowances for present
compliance is uncommon. To account for banking, we extend our benchmark model intro-
ducing the intermediate time T1 ∈ (0, T ) such that, if [0, T1] emissions exceed the [0, T1]
cap, the penalty for non-compliance f is paid.
The possibility to bank allowances has no consequences for our results. As shown in
Carmona and Hinz (2011) and Gru¨ll and Taschini (2011) with banking, the allowances price
at time t = 0 can be decomposed into two parts: the expected value of non-compliance in
[0, T1] and the expected value of non-compliance in (T1, T ], namely the banking value. As
shown in the previous cited papers, this sum is larger than the allowances price evaluated
in a single-phase framework. Therefore, the introduction of an intermediate time does not
reduce (possibly increases) the chances for the monopolist to be in non-compliance.
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Regulatory adjustments To explore the likely impact of regulatory adjustments, possi-
bly occurring after the capacity investment decision of the monopolist, we comment Figure
8, which shows expected profits, E(G), as a function of H and f , respectively, for different
levels of the pass-through coefficient  . The figure is obtained under the average RES mar-
ket setting (see Tables 2, 3, and 4). First of all, we can see that the dependence of E(G)
from both f and H depends on the level of  . In particular, when   is sufficiently large,
expected profits for the monopolist increase (linearly) with f and decrease (not linearly)
with H.
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Figure 8: Expected profits, E(G), as a function of H (panel a) and f (panel b), for different
levels of the pass-through coefficient  .
Therefore, we can argue that, in the case the regulatory authority would adjust one or
both the parameters to reduce the profit opportunities for the monopolist, it should reduce
f and/or increase H. Notice, in particular, that, for low values of f and high values of H,
E(G) flattens out to a level which is independent of  . Such a level corresponds to E(G)
under the BAU scenario (i.e. where the price of allowances falls to zero). Intermediate
adjustments do not cancel the incentive to distort prices by the monopolist. Therefore,
either the regulatory authority selects f and H corresponding to the BAU scenario, or
the monopolist will always seek degenerate solutions. Unfortunately, such an adjustment
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corresponds to ruling out the ETS.
Inelastic electricity demand Our benchmark model assumes a perfectly inelastic elec-
tricity demand D. In particular, D is normally distributed with constant mean µ and
constant standard deviation  . However, one may contend that consumers will respond to
the prospects of high electricity prices and D may not be perfectly elastic. Without impos-
ing any specific relationship between D and electricity prices, we can reasonably assume
that higher electricity prices reduce demand or, equivalently, decrease µ. By varying µ, we
can explore the effect of an elastic electricity demand and argue that it is inconsequential.
To build intuition, let us consider the case where consumers can react to the increase
of electricity prices by investing in (non-conventional) auto-generation. We capture the
impact of this reaction by introducing the random variable Dn representing the resulting
net electricity demand. This change of variables has no consequences for our analytical
results.
Let Dh represent the uncertain self-satisfied electricity demand (self-consumption). We
assume that it is normally distributed with expected value µh and standard deviation  h.
We express the resulting net electricity demand as
Dn = D −Dh ∼ N
 
µ, 2
 
−N
 
µh, 
2
h
 
∼ N
 
µ− µh, 2 +  2h − 2⇢  h
 
,
where D and Dh are jointly normally distributed and ⇢ is the linear correlation coefficient,
which can be assumed positive.
To illustrate the effect of a more elastic D, we let µh vary and set  h = 10, ⇢ =
1
6 ,
and D ∼ N
 
200, 302
 
. Substituting, we obtain Dn ∼ N
 
200− µh, 302
 
. The remaining
settings of Qc, Qnc, and H are the same as those in Table 3. Table 6 summarises the
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impact of an increasing demand elasticity on ∆Q∗nc in the three distinct market settings of
the ETS scenario.
Table 6: Optimal/suboptimal installation of non-conventional capacity for some values of
µh, the expected value of Dh.
∆Q∗nc (MWh)
Market settinga Type of solution µh = 0 µh = 10 µh = 20 µh = 50
Low RES Degenerate 57 52 48 -
Low RES Normal 133.5 125.5 117.5 93
Average RES Degenerate −10.5 −17 −23 −33.5
High RES Degenerate −63 −71.5 −80 −105
a The low RES market setting is characterized by two solutions,
which are labelled as normal and degenerate (see Section 4.2).
The degenerate solutions of all market settings are optimal,
whereas the normal solutions obtained for the low RES market setting are suboptimal,
except for the optimal and normal solution corresponding to µh = 50.
Therefore, we can infer that an increasing demand elasticity (higher values of µh) pushes
the monopolist to reduce investments in non-conventional capacity more aggressively. Al-
though unreported, the green ratios remain unaffected.
Fully competitive market Let us hypothesize that the energy-mix decision is adopted
competitively and independently of the decisions of the other producers. As it can be
easily argued, in a competitive framework, each producer exclusively expands renewables
and the resulting energy-mix would include only green technologies; conventional plants
would be completely replaced. This outcome is highly implausible (and problematic) for
different reasons. First, since electricity demand would be met only by non-conventional
plants, allowance prices, electricity prices, and expected profits would drop to zero for all
producers. This calls into question the economic sustainability of the electricity sector itself.
Second, with an energy-mix dominated by intermittent renewables, the security of supply
would be at risk. Third, we have been observing a significant slowdown of investments in
non-conventional plants in the recent years, which can be explained (at least partially) as a
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non-competitive stance of the electricity sector to prevent the adverse outcomes described
above.
6 Conclusions
This paper addresses the tradeoff that defines the long-term capacity expansion decision
of a monopolist in energy-only markets. We specifically investigate the factors that deter-
mine the optimal/suboptimal energy-mix decision of the monopolist in the context of an
Emissions Trading System (ETS). Understanding the expected outcomes and the tradeoff
associated with such a decision is critical for ensuring effective environmental legislation
and electricity market reforms.
In this paper, we present a model under uncertain electricity demand and derive an-
alytical dependencies between the expansion decision and market prices. We show that
increasing the share of renewables (1) provides the highest profitability and (2) reduces the
chances that an ETS is compliant, which is the most desired outcome for the monopolist.
In particular, we find that, under both a BAU scenario (absence of emission regulations)
and an ETS scenario, the monopolist has an incentive to maintain the renewable capac-
ity at the levels that do not fully satisfy electricity demand. However, under the ETS
scenario, the monopolist has an opportunity to create larger infra-marginal profits by re-
ducing renewable capacity even more markedly. This opportunity consists in setting up an
energy-mix such that the emissions exceed the cap in a systematic fashion, i.e. even under
average values of electricity demand.
The distortion described in this paper is twofold: first, emissions exceed the cap with
high probability; second, prices of electricity and allowances are inflated. The monopo-
list leverages on the first seeking for the second. As we have shown, under such market
structure, the regulatory authority is completely defenseless. Other policies, for example a
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carbon tax, could lessen (or even completely eliminate) this distortion possibly at the cost
of lower economic efficiency.
Perhaps surprisingly, an unintentional consequence of an ETS is an alleviation of the
“missing money problem”. Even in the absence of a security of supply constraint, the mo-
nopolist will not reduce the conventional capacity below the emissions cap since, otherwise,
the distortion of allowances and electricity prices would not be possible.
The results of this analysis do not necessarily extend to other sectors included into
an ETS. What makes the electricity sector subject to the problem discussed here are
two key hypotheses: (1) the cooperative oligopoly feature of the electricity sector (which
we, equivalently, model as a monopoly) and (2) the uniform auction system adopted in
energy-only markets. Related to (1), under perfect competition, renewables will likely
reach 100% of the energy-mix. In this case, a virtually zero electricity price will prevail in
energy-only markets making electricity generation unprofitable. Therefore, if some degree
of concentration is desirable in electricity markets, then the concerns raised in this paper
about the energy-mix distortion via an ETS should be an important issue in the energy
and environmental policy debate.
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